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Abstract !
 In 1765, George Croghan began peace negotiations with Pontiac and the Western 
Confederacy he represented, along with the Delawares, Shawnees, and Ohio Senecas. By 
using a microhistorical approach to analyze this single diplomatic event, this thesis 
explores the complexity and contingency of British imperialism within the northern trans-
Appalachian West. I argue that imperialism and attempts to bring the region under British 
control integrated Indian voices within the imperial project. Indians shaped and defined 
their own relationships with empire while co-opting British imperialism in order to 
achieve their own goals. Furthermore, the empire lacked cohesion as different British 
colonial authorities competed against each other. In the end, the various delegates 
attending this series of treaty negotiations navigated a complicated landscape of political 
and diplomatic power in the northern trans-Appalachian West where Indian, colonial, and 
imperial voices all spoke with authority. Thus, George Croghan’s mission in 1765 can 
only be understood as an amalgamation of imperial, colonial, and Indian visions for the 
northern trans-Appalachian West, working simultaneously alongside and in competition 
with the personal aspirations of the mission’s participants.  
!
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Fig. 1: Map of the delegation’s journey to Detroit, 1765 
Sources: Gregory Evans Dowd, War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, & the 
British Empire (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 150; George Croghan, “George 
Croghan’s Journals, February 28, 1765—October 8, 1765,” The New Regime, ed. 
Clarence Walworth Alvord (Springfield IL: Illinois State Historical Library, 1916), 1-52.  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Introduction 
 As the Seven Years’ War drew toward a close, George Croghan, an Indian agent 
and trader in the official service of Sir William Johnson, Superintendent for Indian 
Affairs in the Northern District, observed that the British “may have defeated the French; 
but…have nothing to boast from the War with the Natives.”  After the Treaty of Paris of 1
1763, the British theoretically took possession of a large expanse of territory west of the 
Appalachian Mountains. While the French may have signed over their “sovereignty” over 
these lands, the Indians, regardless of any French or British claims to the contrary, 
remained truly sovereign. The Natives understood that the British had not conquered 
them and they became suspicious that the British had no intention of maintaining, as had 
the French, economic and martial relationships of reciprocity. French forts in the northern 
trans-Appalachian West had served as trading posts where Indians acquired trade goods, 
such as brass kettles and weapons, which they could not produce on their own but upon 
which they had become dependent. As these forts lowered the French drapeau blanc and 
raised the red British ensign, however, so too did their function change in colonial-Indian 
relations; the forts’ occupants were no longer trading partners to the Indians, but became 
an invading force. Many of the Indians of the northern trans-Appalachian West, finding 
their new “sovereigns” woefully disrespectful of their rights and their ways, banded 
together in a loose “Western Confederacy” and began to violently oppose British 
occupation. The subsequent conflict came to be known as Pontiac’s War, named after one 
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 George Croghan to Sir William Johnson, January 25, 1760, in The Papers of Sir William Johnson 1
(Albany, NY: The University of the State of New York, 1921-1965), vol. 10, 134. (hereafter WJP)
of its most important military, spiritual, and political leaders. Fittingly, when it came time 
to sue for peace in 1765, Croghan, who years earlier had so insightfully observed the 
difference between the French and their Indian allies, received the commission to 
establish terms with Indian leaders. This 1765 diplomatic mission brought Croghan into 
negotiations with the Western Confederacy along with leaders of more easterly Indian 
nations that had joined their cause, including the Ottawa leader Pontiac, the Delaware 
representative Custaloga, and Ohio Seneca military leader Kiashuta.  2
 Croghan’s mission, which began on February 28, 1765, included meetings with 
leaders of over a dozen Indian nations and spanned more than a thousand miles between 
Fort Pitt and Detroit traveled by canoe and on foot. While some of the Indian nations had 
already begun peace discussions with British leaders such as Colonel Henry Bouquet, 
Croghan was charged with establishing cohesive terms that would cement a lasting peace 
and bring a more ordered administration to the newly-acquired British northern trans-
Appalachian West. Croghan first treated with delegates from the Six Nations, Ohio 
Seneca, Shawnee, and Delaware nations. Delegates from these nations then joined 
Croghan as he traveled into the Ohio and Illinois countries to meet with Pontiac. Over the 
course of this mission, Croghan reconnoitered the Ohio Country as part of his own 
personal land speculation schemes. He was also attacked by Kickapoos and Foxes who 
suspected he was a slave raider, and he survived a hatchet to the head. He and his 
delegation were able to convince these nations of the Wabash River region to accept 
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 Gregory Evans Dowd, War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British Empire (Baltimore: 2
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 1, 72-73.
peace with the British, terms agreed upon only after the Shawnees of Croghan’s party 
threatened the Wabash nations with retaliation if they did not comply. Most importantly, 
in conference, both Croghan and Pontiac were able to agree to terms, with Pontiac 
acknowledging British metaphorical fatherhood on behalf of the loose Western 
Confederacy and the British acknowledging the land and trade rights of the Western 
nations.  
 Croghan’s mission reveals valuable insights into the imperial process, a 
conceptualization of empire building that more fully integrates the influence and 
participation of non-imperial actors within countervailing structures of power. For 
example, metropolitan British policies were often at odds with the objectives of the 
colonial governments while colonial settlers similarly resented both British and colonial 
policies. Similarly, Croghan’s mission also reveals how Indians participated in, 
influenced, and contributed to the imperial process. These Indian nations were no more 
unified than the British, often leveraging their relationships with colonial powers in order 
to gain influence over one another. Therefore, in order to achieve his goals, Croghan had 
to balance competing interests within a complicated landscape of political and diplomatic 
power in the northern trans-Appalachian West. This region was simultaneously claimed 
by trans-Atlantic empires, looked upon with hungry eyes by colonists eager to settle, and 
governed by sovereign Indians grappling to reconcile their desire for trade and autonomy. 
The imperial process that steered George Croghan’s mission in 1765 can only be 
understood as an amalgamation of imperial, colonial, and Indian visions for the northern 
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trans-Appalachian West, working simultaneously alongside and in competition with the 
personal aspirations of the mission’s participants.  
!
Historiography, methodology, and definition of terms 
 Historians have long grappled with how to interpret Pontiac’s War specifically 
and the imperial conflict between Europeans and Native peoples more generally, leading 
to a variety of positions. Francis Parkman serves as a historiographical starting point, 
whiggishly arguing in his 1851 work, The Conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian War 
after the Conquest of Canada, that Pontiac was the leader of the trans-Appalachian 
Indians’ last gasp of autonomy in resisting the inevitable advance of Western civilization, 
an interpretation that has garnered a wide range of criticism.  Francis Jennings asserted 3
that Parkman over-emphasized Pontiac’s importance to the uprising, pointing out that 
Pontiac was in fact answering the call to war issued by Senecas, Delawares, and 
Shawnees. Instead, according to Jennings, Pontiac should be seen as just one of many 
leaders during what Jennings termed the “Forty Years’ War,” a struggle for trans-
Appalachian Indian independence from 1755 to 1795 of which Pontiac’s War was a part. 
Jennings wanted to deemphasize Pontiac’s War because Parkman’s conceptualization of 
the conflict was rooted in a romanticization of Indian resistance to a teleological 
advancement of Western civilization.  Similarly, William R. Nester argues that focusing 4
 6
 Francis Parkman, The Conspiracy of Pontiac (New York: The Library of America, 1991), 343-951.3
 Francis Jennings, Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies & Tribes in the Seven Years War in America (New 4
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988), 438-453, especially 442.
on Pontiac obscures the war’s true causes. The center of attention should be Sir Jeffrey 
Amherst, commander of the British military in North America. According to Nester, 
Amherst’s arrogance and mismanagement of Indian affairs caused such rage among a 
wide variety of Native peoples that the war should instead be called “Amherst’s” instead 
of “Pontiac’s.”  Gregory Evans Dowd and Matthew C. Ward echo this sentiment, arguing 5
that when the British attempted to secure the lands west of the Appalachian Mountains at 
the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War, they failed to show proper deference to the 
Indian peoples who lived there as the French previously had. Indians had tolerated and 
cooperated with the French because the French entered into relationships with Indians 
marked by reciprocity, not domination. Furthermore, while Parkman interpreted the war 
as a failure for the Indians, Dowd argues that the war ended as an ambiguous stalemate, 
with the British assuming they had secured dominance over the northern trans-
Appalachian West and the resisting Indians assuming that they had secured their status as 
nations in the eyes of the British.  6
 In addition to studies of Pontiac’s War, many historians have explored the 
contours of imperial relationships in the northern trans-Appalachian West more generally. 
William J. Campbell asserts that the process of land speculation and the negotiations that 
took place as part of that process were the primary force that determined both British 
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 William R. Nester, “Haughty Conquerors”: Amherst and the Great Indian Uprising of 1763 (Westport, 5
CT: Praeger, 2000), vii-xiv.
 Dowd, War under Heaven, 54-59, 274-275; Matthew C. Ward, Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven 6
Years’ War in Virginia and Pennsylvania 1754-1765 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003), 219. 
For the purpose of clarity the conflict will be referred to as “Pontiac’s War” within this study. For a more 
complete discussion of the historiography of the conflict’s nomenclature, see Dowd, War under Heaven, 
5-6.
imperial policy and the extent of Indian sovereignty. Peter Silver argues that the 
extraordinary level of violence between Indian and European peoples in the time between 
the Seven Years’ War and the American Revolution effectively racialized the divisions 
between these two groups, making Indians shockingly savage in European eyes. 
Similarly, Ward maintains that the Seven Years’ War transformed a mid-Atlantic 
Appalachian borderland marked by Indian and colonial cooperation into a zone of Indian-
European tension and animosity. Eric Hinderaker sees the Ohio Valley as a “crucible of 
imperial experimentation,” as it was here that French, British, and eventually independent 
Americans worked to define what imperialism truly meant for their respective 
governments. Furthermore, in regards to the period surrounding the imperial conflicts of 
the Seven Years’ War, Hinderaker argues that both the French and the British were in the 
process of transforming their imperial vision for the Ohio Valley, transitioning from 
“empires of commerce” into “empires of land.”  7
 While these historians have certainly identified some of the causes of imperial 
conflict in the trans-Appalachian West, a more focused microhistory can illuminate more 
clearly how complicated the imperial process actually was. By examining an event from a 
narrower vantage point, it becomes clear that larger concepts such as racialized violence 
or rampant land speculation cannot fully explain the causality of a single historical event. 
Commenting on his own proposed models of empire, Hinderaker states that they “are 
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 William J. Campbell, Speculators in Empire: Iroquoia and the 1768 Treat of Fort Stanwix (Norman, OK: 7
University of Oklahoma Press, 2012), 11-13; Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War 
Transformed Early America (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2008), xvii-xxvi; Ward, 3-5; Eric 
Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi-xiv.
entirely distinct only as an analytical construct.”  Yet, the trans-Appalachian West was a 8
“zone of international friction,” to borrow Lawrence Henry Gipson’s term, and the 
political tension within the region can only be understood through an analysis that 
includes but does not privilege or over-emphasize trans-Atlantic imperial forces that 
exerted themselves from abroad. Therefore  seemingly microhistorical/Atlantic approach
—simultaneously narrow and intentionally broad—is useful for constructing an 
understanding of the complexity, contingency, and interconnectedness of the imperial 
process in the northern trans-Appalachian West. While self-serving land speculation, 
racial binaries, and imperial rivalries are observable within this mission, one single 
explanation is unsatisfactory.  
 The complicated political and personal geography that George Croghan traversed 
makes the record of the mission a valuable document for framing a study. Croghan 
simultaneously moved through regions firmly controlled by different Indian and colonial 
polities, regions that had recently brought two trans-Atlantic empires to war with each 
other, and regions where Croghan had a strong personal financial stake. Yet, while 
Croghan and the other diplomats and politicians involved were influenced by a myriad of 
personal and local motivations, the mission had but one official purpose: to secure peace 
and end Pontiac’s War. As such, this study of George Croghan’s diplomatic mission will 
serve as an exercise in constructing what Lara Putnam terms a “‘telling example’ that 
 9
 Hinderaker, xi.8
proves the existence of connections heretofore denied”  or at least not fully understood. 9
The outcomes of the mission were contingent on a complex combination of personal 
relationships fostered years before through trade and unresolved grudges and deep-seated 
animosity formed through years of violence. There is value in muddying the tidy 
narratives of the old imperial history, using approaches of a “new imperial history” to 
construct, as historian Timothy J. Shannon suggests:  
[a] narrative from imperial, colonial, and native perspectives. Unlike the 
work of earlier imperial historians, which focused on policymaking and 
administration, this approach examines the cultural as well as political 
dimensions of Britain’s emergence as an imperial power, including its 
effect on the formation of national and colonial identities and encounters 
between colonizers and natives.  10!
A study of British imperial politics alone fails to take into account the role played and the 
power wielded by Indians and colonial settlers. Native peoples simultaneously resisted 
imperial domination and cooperated with its construction. Colonists had sharply 
contrasting visions for the administration and settlement of the northern trans-
Appalachian West. The actions and aspirations of Indians and colonists work at once in 
tension and in tandem with metropolitan attempts at cohesive imperial policy. Only a 
narrative that fully includes these forces can accurately explain the process and outcomes 
of Croghan’s 1765 diplomatic mission.  11
 10
 Lara Putnam, “To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the Atlantic World,” Journal of Social 9
History 39, no. 3 (Spring 2006): 615-630, quotation on 616.
 Timothy J. Shannon, Indians and Colonists at the Crossroads of Empire: The Albany Congress of 1754 10
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 11.
 Ian Steele, “Exploding Colonial American History: Amerindian, Atlantic, and Global Perspectives,” 11
Reviews in American History 26, no. 1 (March 1998): 70-95, especially 84-85; Brian Sandberg, “Beyond 
Encounters: Religion, Ethnicity, and Violence in the Early Modern Atlantic World, 1492-1700,” Journal of 
World History 17, no. 1 (March, 2006), 1-25, especially 7.
 In order to approach the treaty negotiations, and most importantly, read past the 
bias of the colonizer, a certain ethnohistorical approach is required. The records of these 
negotiations are, on their surface, records of imperialism. They were written by 
Europeans who sought to assert their dominance over Indians. Yet, these documents 
simultaneously contain moments of Indian power. A quickly recorded observation about 
the “curiosity” of Indian diplomatic ways can instead be read as evidence of Indian 
diplomatic strength. If such protocols were unimportant to Europeans, as such brevity 
suggests, and Indian peoples did not have the power to insist that their ways be respected, 
it is unlikely that the European delegates would have bothered with them at all. Yet they 
did, and therefore it is important to approach these documents with a certain awareness in 
order to fully understand what happened during the negotiations, instead of blindly 
assuming that European records were complete. Such awareness is made possible through 
careful understanding of the diplomatic ways of Indian peoples. 
 By carefully observing the ways that Indians asserted their sovereignty, it 
becomes clear that Indians did not acquiesce to British dominance, but instead negotiated 
their role within the empire while expressing their expectations for reciprocity. As Jane T. 
Merritt observes, 
the battle for dominance in North America took place as much in treaty  
conferences as on the field. There the war of words and images shaped the 
history and future of Indian-white relations. Although words could not 
destroy life as guns or disease could, as Euramerican and native American 
 11
leaders manipulated the language of diplomacy and the treaty record 
words determined the political boundaries and balance of power.  12!
Although the journals that Croghan created to record his progress and observations on the 
mission were written in English, they were simultaneously texts written in an Indian 
diplomatic language. They incorporated diplomatic metaphors of spirituality and kinship 
created and defined by Indian peoples. In order to more fully extract the Indian voice 
from these texts expressed through the “treaty protocol,” one therefore must call upon the 
work of anthropologists such as William N. Fenton.  Similarly, Anthony F. C. Wallace 13
explores the function of revitalization movements within indigenous cultures that became 
an essential feature of Croghan’s mission. Pontiac called upon an eschatological vision 
articulated by the Delaware prophet Neolin to justify his actions, and Croghan, in the 
process of his mission, directly encountered and failed to fully understand this 
discourse.   14
 There are a number of historians who have taken similar approaches to colonial 
history. Michael N. McConnell, Richard White, James H. Merrell, and Daniel K. Richter 
have produced works of larger scope that provide invaluable historical context within 
which to interpret Croghan’s treaty negotiations. Specifically, McConnell and White see 
the regions through which Croghan moved as places where conflict and negotiations 
 12
 Jane T. Merritt, At the Crossroads: Indians & Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700-1763 (Chapel 12
Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 231.
 William N. Fenton, “Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making,” in The 13
History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, eds. Francis Jennings et al. (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University 
Press, 1985), 3-36.
 Anthony F. C. Wallace, Revitalizations & Mazeways: Essays on Culture Change, Volume 1 (Lincoln, NE: 14
University of Nebraska Press, 2003), 38-47.
produced political and cultural environments marked by a lack of single hegemonic 
control.  Such a complicated understanding of political geography is central to this 15
study. Merrell’s concept of the “go-between,” an agent capable of traversing cultural 
barriers, helps one fully understand Croghan’s importance.  Richter has assisted 16
historians in re-orienting their perspective, viewing the Atlantic World through Indian and 
not European eyes.  All of these historians strive to uncover Indian voices in ways that 17
demonstrate the full agency of Indian politicians and diplomats within the northern trans-
Appalachian West.   18
 The primary documentation used for this study includes the journals that George 
Croghan kept during the mission. In order to clarify this record, this study will also 
consult Croghan’s correspondence with other imperial agents, along with the writings of 
Sir William Johnson and others. As with any colonial document, the writings of Croghan 
inherently commit certain acts of textual violence. Barely literate himself, his journals fail 
to record the full depth and nuance of Indian voices. Though he was famed for his 
knowledge of Indian diplomatic ways, Croghan produced records of treaty negotiations 
that were ultimately cultural translations. Even when both sides were speaking English, 
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 Michael M. McConnell, A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and its Peoples, 1724-1744 15
(Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1992); White, Middle Ground.
 James H. Merrell, Into the American Woods: Negotiations on the Pennsylvania Frontier (New York: W. 16
W. Norton & Co., 1999).
 Daniel K. Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America (Cambridge, 17
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001); Richter, Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois 
League in the Era of European Colonization (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 
1992).
 See also Gail D. MacLeitch, Imperial Entanglements: Iroquois Change and Persistence on the Frontiers 18
of Empire (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); David L. Preston, The Texture of 
Contact: European and Indian Settler Communities on the Frontiers of Iroquoia, 1667-1783 (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2009); Timothy J. Shannon, Iroquois Diplomacy on the Early American 
Frontier (New York: The Penguin Group, 2008).
which was not always the case, their ways of knowing differed. Native Americans 
communicated diplomacy through dramatic performance, with as much meaning 
expressed non-verbally as with the words that they spoke. As Merrell puts it, “It is 
clear…that even an interpreter committed to accurate translation had a difficult time 
getting messages through the cultural and linguistic interference, through the profound 
difference in agendas and customs.”  Richter echoes this insight, stating that “oral 19
narratives reduced to written texts lose not only tears and laughter but the verbal 
emphases and body language that convey much of the emotional content of the speakers’ 
messages.”  Just as dampness or fire might obscure an archival text, forcing historians to 20
fill in blanks where words are obfuscated by rot or flames, so too must it be assumed that 
large portions of intended meaning have been lost in treaty minutes due to inaccurate or 
incomplete recording. As such, in order to fully unpack the records that Croghan kept 
during his mission one must pull meanings from the text that may have fallen outside the 
boundaries of the author’s intent. Events that Croghan may have recorded as mere 
curiosities without much editorial comment were nonetheless integral to the peace 
process. 
 In order to accurately understand the significance of Croghan’s 1765 mission, it is 
necessary to firmly define the terms used within this study. To begin with, one must 
clarify the large, amorphous, and unwieldy concept of empire. Thus, this study will 
 14
 Merrell, Into the American Woods, 210.19
 Richter, Facing East from Indian Country, 118.20
employ an interpretation of empire in line with the definition put forth by Hinderaker in 
which empires are conceived “more like processes than structures.” His empires are thus, 
negotiated systems; individuals could shape, challenge, or resist 
colonialism in  many ways. They were also sites for intercultural relations. 
…Native Americans actively participated in the European imperial 
systems that connected them with France and Britain. So, too, did 
thousands of individual colonists, whose ties to the sources of imperial 
authority in Europe were by no means simple or direct.  21!
Thus, the term “imperial process,” in which a centralized imperial vision is negotiated 
within the constellation of various colonial and Indian interests, will be used throughout 
this study. Croghan, as an agent of the Indian Department, was certainly connected to the 
directives of the metropole. Yet the choices he made, choices that would prove central to 
his negotiations, were also strongly influenced by his own personal interests. 
Furthermore, Croghan had to balance the demands of colonists and Indians who held firm 
beliefs concerning the nature and extent of British imperialism. British power was not 
strong enough to impose its will on the region without compromise. This term, “imperial 
process,” more fully incorporates Michel Foucault’s observation that “there is no binary 
and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power 
relations.”  The alliances and identities within the imperial process were fluid. The lines 22
that separated imperial, colonial, and Indian were often blurred by individual interest. 
Therefore, these divisions are purely analytical and are not used with the intent of neatly 
 15
 Hinderaker, xi-xii.21
 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage 22
Books, 1990), 94. This Foucauldian theory of power is applied to North American eighteenth-century 
imperialism by Malick W. Ghachem, "Montesquieu in the Caribbean: The Colonial Enlightenment between 
Code Noir and Code Civil,” Historical Reflections/Réflexions historiques 25, no. 2 (1999): 185-187.
dividing the various actors participating in these negotiations within one of these three 
groups. In fact, one of the central purposes of this study is illuminating the complicated 
reality in which individuals negotiated with each other while either moving among these 
various forces or representing more than one force simultaneously. Moreover, Croghan’s 
mission will demonstrate that these political forces were in no way unified; this imperial 
process placed individual colonies at odds with each other while various Indian polities 
held diverse visions for their relationships with empire and used this mission as an 
opportunity to exert political and military influence over each other.  
 Additionally, this study employs certain political and geographic terms that need 
to be clarified. This study will distinguish between two groups of Indian nations that took 
up arms against the British during Pontiac’s War. The term “Western Confederacy” will 
include the nations of the Great Lakes region—the Ottawa, Potawatomis, Chippewas 
(Ojibwes), and Hurons—along with the nations of the Illinois Country—the Weas, 
Piankeshaws, Miamis, Kickapoos, and Foxes. The eastern nations that resided in the Ohio 
Country and had longer standing relationships with British imperialism, the Shawnees, 
Ohio Senecas, and Delawares, will be discussed separately from the “Western 
Confederacy.” Furthermore, for the sake of clarity, Croghan’s terms for Indian nations 
will be used, albeit standardized, with one notable exception. Because of the wide variety 
of spellings used for the Meskwaki, the more familiar term, Fox, will be used. Finally, the 
geographic term northern trans-Appalachian West will, for the purpose of the study, refer 
 16
to the area north of the Ohio River, east of the Mississippi River, and south of the Great 
Lakes, in addition to west of the Appalachian Mountains. 
 This study will use George Croghan’s diplomatic mission to Detroit in 1765 as a 
case study of the imperial process in the northern trans-Appalachian West. By analyzing 
the actions and political motivations of the colonists, Indians, and British agents 
involved, a number of characteristics of this process become clear. First, George Croghan 
acted simultaneously as an imperial agent, with the British vision for the northern trans-
Appalachian West in mind, and as an enterprising land speculator with an opportunity for 
enormous financial gain. Therefore, the consequences of Croghan’s involvement in these 
proceedings cannot be understood without conceiving of Croghan as both an imperialist 
and a self-serving individual. Secondly, while the Appalachian Mountains were in the 
process of becoming a border that racially divided Indians and Europeans, these 
racialized concepts were not politically useful during the proceedings of 1765. Indians 
increasingly feared that compromise with white settlers was impossible while colonists 
were coming to believe that all Indians were racialized enemies, but these assumptions 
were abandoned during these negotiations out of political necessity, even as the discourse 
appeared rhetorically within the records of the proceedings. Third, while official British 
and French imperial policy dictated that the British controlled the northern trans-
Appalachian West, informal French remnants of empire continued to exert influence over 
the politics of the region. Fourth, the mission’s conclusions were rife with “creative 
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misunderstandings,”  in which negotiated terms, especially in regards to definitions of 23
sovereignty as expressed through kinship metaphors, were interpreted differently in order 
to appease the various powers involved. The malleability of these metaphors was an 
essential element in securing peace. Finally, in the end, local contingencies, 
unforeseeable to those involved, were as influential as the predetermined hopes of these 
individuals. The imperial process was as much the result of happenstance as larger 
geopolitical forces. Employing a microhistorical/Atlantic approach, through the study of 
George Croghan’s diplomatic mission, illuminates the imperial process as a constellation 
of various imperial, colonial, and Indian forces—a process that, in order to come to any 
substantial conclusions, had to navigate the confluences of power in the region. 
!
British imperial reorganization, Indian policy, and treaty negotiations prior to 1765 
 In order to understand the political and diplomatic tensions that influenced 
Croghan’s mission, one must first contextualize it. When Croghan and Pontiac met in 
1765, they did so within a dynamic political geography. The increase in British-held 
western territories at the conclusion of the Seven Years’ War put an added strain on 
already tenuous relationships. The British had previously delegated to colonial 
governments the power to negotiate with Native Americans. However, the Albany 
Congress of 1754 initiated a process of gradual centralization of Indian affairs. Moving 
forward, the newly ordained Indian superintendencies handled Indian affairs. In the 
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North, Sir William Johnson served as Indian superintendent, while John Stuart served as 
superintendent in the South. This was a challenging change for the colonial governments 
that had used their influence among Indians in order to lay claim on western lands. In 
fact, these colonial claims had been an impetus for centralization, as they often 
overlapped and at times led to violence between colonies. However, this new 
arrangement did not prevent all tension and imperial indecisiveness in regards to Indian 
affairs; Johnson and Stuart regularly worked at cross purposes.   24
 In addition to the formation of the Indian departments, the British made a further 
attempt to centralize and standardize their approach. Sir William Johnson backed a set of 
proposals set forth in the “Plan for the Future Management of Indian Affairs.” While this 
plan, which Richter refers to as the “Plan of 1764,” was never adopted, it offers a glimpse 
into the strategy that Johnson and his deputies employed during negotiations with Indian 
nations. This strategy required a firm boundary between land settled by Indians and 
European colonists (as articulated by the Proclamation Line of 1763), well regulated 
trade between Europeans and Indians, a mutually agreed upon judicial system that could 
arbitrate disputes between Europeans and Indians, and an Indian department even more 
centralized than the two departments settled upon at Albany.  All of these proposals 
served as an attempt to reverse the damage done to British-Indian relations by Sir Jeffery 
Amherst.  Yet, even as the British tried to centralize and standardize their administration 25
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of Indian affairs, they struggled in the eighteenth century to offer a consistent 
interpretation of the status of Indians within the empire. Some nations considered 
themselves wholly sovereign. This was especially true of the nations who occupied the 
northern trans-Appalachian West. At times the British considered Indians to be crown 
subjects, although by the time of Croghan’s mission, most Indian nations who still 
functioned as cohesive political units would have chaffed under such a definition. 
Instead, a third position, that of a protectorate, was the preferred approach of the British 
after the Seven Years’ War, regardless of what terminology they used. During 
negotiations, Croghan and the Indian leaders with whom he treated had to define their 
imperial relationships despite the absence of a firm British position.  26
 Just as imperial reorganization caused as much tension as it reconciled among the 
divisions of the empire, treaties between the British and Indian nations created tensions 
among separate Indian nations and provincial governments, changing the political 
geography of the northern trans-Appalachian West. Therefore treaties should not be 
understood simply as a binary construction between Indians and the British. For example, 
at the 1752 Treaty of Logstown, held in a Shawnee town located on the Ohio River and 
attended by Croghan, conflicting land claims put Indian nations at odds with each other. 
The Six Nations renounced extensive claims to Western lands. However, these lands were 
predominately settled by Delawares who had been pushed into the Ohio Country by the 
expansion of colonial Pennsylvania. The Delawares did not forget this wound, and the 
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repercussions of these treaties could be felt in Croghan’s negotiations in 1765. At the 
same time, this particular treaty was the site of tension between Pennsylvania and 
Virginia as both colonies sought to control the land just west of the Forks of the Ohio. To 
complicate things further, many of the colonial representatives at the treaty were 
personally financially invested. This was especially true of Croghan, who held a personal 
title to land in the region of the Forks of the Ohio (although these claims were often 
disputed by other land speculators).  
 Croghan was also in attendance at the Treaty of Easton, signed in 1758 in the 
midst of the Seven Years’ War. Here the British, hoping to reverse the allegiance of those 
Delawares, Shawnees, and Six Nations that had joined the French, pledged to limit 
colonial settlement to the east of the Appalachian Mountains, an agreement that served as 
a precursor to the Proclamation Line of 1763. Additionally, the British gave land back to 
the Iroquois. However, much of this territory had formerly belonged to the Delawares, 
thus adding to pre-existing tensions. Finally, the newly formed “Friendly Association for 
Regaining and Preserving Peace with the Indians by Pacific Measures” organized by 
politically-minded Quakers in order to reclaim their influence with Indians from both the 
Pennsylvania proprietary government and the British Indian department, sided with the 
Delawares and further complicated the political constellation of British, colonial, and 
Indian relations.  27
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 The greatest shift in British imperial administration came with the conclusion of 
the Seven Years’ War. Upon gaining claims to large amounts of formerly French territory, 
the British also assumed that they had acquired sovereignty over western Indian nations 
who had grown to appreciate their previous relationship with the French. While the 
French had administered their North American empire by relying on reciprocal 
relationships with autonomous Indian nations in order to facilitate a lucrative fur trade, 
the British intended to occupy the northern trans-Appalachian West, showing little 
concern for Indian autonomy, diplomatic ways, or their gift-centered economy and 
culture. Such indifference drove Indian military leaders, such as the Ottawa Pontiac and 
the Ohio Seneca Kiashuta, to organize a violent resistance to British occupation, known 
as Pontiac’s War, beginning with the siege of Fort Detroit on April 27, 1763. Two years 
after the conflict began, Croghan, who had warned British administrators about ignoring 
Indian diplomatic protocols and had established himself as a skilled negotiator, was 
charged by Sir William Johnson with negotiating peace.  28
!
George Croghan, trader, land-speculator, and imperial agent 
 In order to fully understand the record of the 1765 diplomatic mission, the 
biography of its author must also be considered. George Croghan’s value to Sir William 
Johnson was due to his wealth of experience as a trader, land speculator, and as an agent 
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for the colony of Pennsylvania. Croghan’s career as a “go-between” began when he set 
up a trading post in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. While many of his 
contemporaries considered him to be uncouth, he was undoubtedly wily, as he amassed a 
large fortune and extensive land holdings as a result of his relationships with Indians. In 
1746, the Onondaga Council officially welcomed Croghan, giving him an authorized 
voice within Iroquoia and initiating him into the Iroquois kinship system both literally 
and figuratively. Colonists who worked as “go-betweens” were often accepted into 
Native communities, an action consecrated by bestowing upon them Native names; 
Croghan became Anaquarunda. Croghan, following in the footsteps of Sir William 
Johnson, took either a Native mistress or wife (the definitions of which were different 
among the Mohawk and the English), the daughter of the powerful Mohawk sachem, 
Nickus. Croghan’s daughter by this officially sanctioned relationship, Catherine, later 
married the Mohawk military leader, Joseph Brant. Yet, while Croghan certainly grew to 
admire many individuals among the people of the Six Nations, his intimacy with the 
Iroquois was also a financial investment. Using his connections to Iroquoia, in 1749 
Croghan secured 200,000 acres of Indian land in the region of the Forks of the Ohio, 
making him one of the leading land speculators within the colonies. Thus, while Croghan 
often described himself as Indian, his real-estate ambitions betrayed his self-serving 
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attitude. As with many others, the language of adoption and kinship was “a convenient 
fiction.”  29
 Croghan served as an Indian agent for the Pennsylvania colony beginning when 
he presented the Six Nations with a large number of gifts, including wampum, at the 
Logstown Conference of 1748 in appreciation for fighting against the French.  30
 Because of his extensive knowledge and comfort with Indian ways, Croghan was 
selected to join Sir William Johnson as an Indian agent, coming into Johnson’s service in 
1756. Johnson entrusted Croghan to “hold Conference, send Messages & treat with the 
Indians for the good of His Majestys Service and the extention of the British Indian 
Interest agreable to such Instructions & Directions as you shall from time to time receive 
from me.”  Johnson himself operated at the behest of British military authorities, and did 31
not need any approval from colonial governments. 
 Croghan was undoubtedly well versed in the diplomatic ways of the Indian 
nations with whom he treated. His record demonstrates that he understood that 
negotiations had to be conducted on discursively Indian ground. In a battle for diplomatic 
dominance, Native Americans, according to Merrell, “won by insisting that their 
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diplomatic customs hold sway.”  While European diplomacy required that an accurate, 32
dated record be made of the negotiations, the language and process used within these 
trans-cultural diplomatic moments was almost entirely Native American, thus 
demonstrating that the power dynamics within trans-cultural diplomacy were not one-
sided. As Merritt states, Euro-Americans “often let Indian traditions set the general 
standards for their meetings. They treated Indians as diplomatic equals and accepted, 
used, and contributed to the forms and language of native rituals and ceremonies.”  33
Thus, Croghan had to learn, as he himself stated, the “mystery and Policy of the People 
of this Country.”  Fluent in Native American ways of diplomacy, he offered wampum as 34
a symbolic gesture of authority: “Further, your Brothers have sent you this string of 
Wampum to desire that you may not give Credit to every Report that you will here, either 
from Indians or White men.”  According to Merrell, wampum “served to ‘confirm’ or 35
‘enforce’ [a diplomat’s] words, it guaranteed that ‘we speak truth’ and ensured that a 
speech would… ‘have its full Effect on’ the listener’s ‘Mind.’”  Just as the signature on 36
an official document might give the document authority, the string of wampum ensured 
that Croghan officially spoke for the colonial government and that those who might have 
spoken otherwise did not. 
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 However, it is important not to inflate Croghan’s credentials as an advocate of 
Indian ways and culture. He was a man of his time and many of his statements 
concerning Indian people betray his biases. Yet, within the context of the eighteenth 
century, Croghan was capable of seeing through certain amounts prejudice and bigotry on 
behalf of Europeans. For example, Dr. William Robertson, in his research for what would 
become The History of America, interviewed Croghan in 1777. Croghan was asked, “Are 
the Indians defective in the Animal Passions for their females, and are they inferior to the 
People of the Ancient Continent both in desire and ability?” The wording of the question 
betrayed a prejudice designed to create biological distance between Europeans and 
Native Americans. Croghan responded, 
the Indians are No way Deffective in the Animal Passions for thire 
feamales, & have as Great Desiers and abilitys I blive as any Nations can 
have, butt they have a Natural Modiesty in thire behaver which prevents 
thire Desier being Easyly Discoverd & phaps they have more affection for 
thire Children & Relations then any other Nations on Earth. !
Croghan further stated, in response to two other questions about Native families that, “No 
pople on Earth Take more Carr of thire Children,” and “No pople Can have more 
affection for thire Children, & the Returns of Duty, may be compaird. with other 
Nations.” On the other hand, Croghan’s language often fell more in line with his 
contemporaries. At one point during his journey to Detroit in 1765, Croghan wrote to 
Johnson to report on his progress. In describing the French who remained in Illinois, he 
stated, “Every frenchman in the Coleny Live[s] by Trading with the Indians & has Most 
of them been Bread up with them they all Spake the Indian Langudge…they are a More 
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Savidge pople than ye. Indians if there Can be any pople So.”  Additionally, even in the 
previously cited, more sympathetic examples, Croghan refers to Native Americans as a 
singular people and nation, despite the fact that his own diplomatic experience 
overwhelmingly disproved such a broad oversimplification.  37
 George Croghan was therefore a complicated man with equally complicated 
opinions about the Native peoples with whom he associated. He would claim to be a great 
friend of the Indians when the situation suited such claims. His success was built upon his 
mastery of the complicated methods of Native diplomacy as well as a keen understanding 
of Native politics. Yet, he was quick to claim Indian land if it facilitated his own 
economic aspirations, and equally quick to claim that Indian ways were evidence of their 
savagery. Thus Croghan’s nature is just one of many complications that make 
understanding his 1765 mission so challenging. 
!
Croghan calls for treaty negotiations—Fort Pitt, February 28 to March 19, 1765 
 George Croghan, through years of experience as a trader and diplomat among 
Indian peoples, was called upon to act as a representative of Sir William Johnson during 
peace negotiations. These negotiations were an attempt to bring lasting peace to the 
northern trans-Appalachian West and end Pontiac’s War. Fort Pitt was his first 
destination, were he was to meet with representatives of the Delawares, Shawnees, and 
Ohio Iroquois who had joined with the Western Confederacy in war against the British. 
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Accompanied by Lieutenant Alexander Fraser, he arrived on February 28, 1765, where he 
met Captain William Murray and another agent, Alexander McKee. Croghan began his 
business by inviting Indian leaders to a formal treaty conference in order to set the terms 
of peace and sovereignty among the British.  In calling for treaty negotiations, 38
Croghan’s actions demonstrated the influence of his own personal investment in 
westward land speculation and trade, the political ineffectiveness of the emerging racial 
binary, and the residual influence of French imperialism. By holding the conference at 
Fort Pitt, Croghan was doing more than advocating for the British imperial position. The 
fort lay in the middle of the geography of Croghan’s most potentially lucrative land 
speculation. While racialized violence erupted throughout the region, as demonstrated by 
the Conestoga Massacre perpetrated by the Paxton Boys on December 14, 1763 and the 
vigilante actions of the Black Boys on March 6, 1765 in Western Pennsylvania, 
Croghan’s negotiations required a more nuanced understanding of power dynamics that 
pitted different Indian nations against each other, such as the Iroquois and Delawares, 
along with factions and polities within the British Empire, such as the Pennsylvania 
proprietary government and politically minded Quakers. Finally, Indian representatives 
continued to claim French support for the Indian cause, despite no evidence of formal 
French involvement. 
 Among those invited were the Delawares, led by Custaloga; the Shawnees, led by 
Lawoughgua; and Ohio Senecas (who had settled in the Ohio Country and acted 
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independently of the Onondaga Council), led by Kiashuta. A formidable task lay before 
Croghan. Pontiac’s War had begun in May, 1763, when a loose confederacy of Indians 
from various western tribes, such as the Ottawas, Ojibwas, Potawatomies, Foxes, Hurons, 
Piankeshaws, Weas, and Kickapoos, following the leadership of the Ottawa Pontiac, 
began besieging and occupying formerly French forts that had become British 
possessions as the result of the Treaty of Paris in 1763. Additionally, Indian prophets such 
as the Delaware Neolin articulated a spiritual discourse that not only motivated western 
Indians toward war but invited more easterly Indian nations who had formerly allied with 
the British, such as the Delawares, Shawnees, and Ohio Senecas, to join in the armed 
resistance to British imperial encroachment. In order to secure peace, Croghan and the 
British had to simultaneously balance the demands of the Indian nations over whom the 
British tentatively claimed “fatherhood” and the increasingly resentful colonists who in 
the crucible of violence had grown to consider all Indians as enemies. Moreover, the 
British had to contend with colonial governments that held competing land claims (some 
involving Croghan himself) and had grown accustomed to managing their own Indian 
affairs.  39
 It is not surprising that Croghan’s diplomatic mission began at Fort Pitt; it was a 
military post of great importance to the British, Pennsylvanians, and Virginians and its 
location had served as a trade nexus for the French and the various Indian nations of the 
region during its previous incarnation as Fort Duquesne. Fort Pitt successfully broke the 
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siege attempted by the Indian confederacy, and its defense represented a clear British 
victory during Pontiac’s War. Furthermore, Fort Pitt stood at the heart of the contested 
colonial backcountry, occupied by both Euro-American settlers and Indians 
(predominately Delawares and Ohio Senecas). Geographically, the fort stood along the 
Proclamation Line of 1763, the proposed border that divided Britain’s imperial holdings, 
designating land to the east as available for colonial settlement and land to the west as 
reserved for Britain’s Indian subjects. However, Fort Pitt held personal significance for 
Croghan; it lay within territory that he claimed as his own, land acquired through dubious 
land speculation. Thus, it simultaneously functioned as a reminder of imperial 
encroachment for Indians, as the last line of defense between colonial settlers and regions 
designated by the British as Indian country, as a symbol of a British policy of 
accommodation towards Indians at the expense of settler interests, and as a central 
location for Croghan’s personal investment. For all parties involved, Fort Pitt factored 
strongly into any negotiations of imperial arrangements.  40
 Croghan encountered his first hurdle shortly after arriving at Fort Pitt, and in so 
doing experienced the violent tension between British imperial authorities and western 
colonial settlers along with the increased racialization of the Appalachian region. His 
train of trade goods, while en route to Fort Pitt, was seized and destroyed on March 6 by 
the “Black Boys,” a group of vigilantes enforcing the ban on the Indian trade. In the eyes 
of these colonial settlers, these goods, in the hands of Indians, would support them in 
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their indiscriminate violence against the colonists. Croghan, along with Sir William 
Johnson, insisted that the goods were intended for diplomatic purposes, as gifting-giving 
was an essential element of Indian diplomacy. As Johnson stated in a letter to General 
Thomas Gage, “Mr. Croghan had not the least interest in the concern with the Goods, but 
that they were intended to remain at Fort Pitt till the Illinois was in our possession.”  41
Croghan loudly proclaimed the injustice done to him, stating “Such an outrage & 
Insolance in ye. face of boath Sivel & Military athouraty Shure Can Nevver be fergiven 
Till the perpetraters are brought to Justus.”  He emphasized the damage that the lost 42
goods would cause to peace negotiations. Military authorities agreed with Croghan on 
this account, and allowed Croghan to purchase replacement goods on credit and promised 
to protect the second convoy.  Aware that indifference to Indian diplomatic ways had 43
motivated Indian nations towards violence, British authorities were determined to change 
their approach to Indian affairs, both ignoring and condemning popular colonial 
sentiment in the region.  44
 However, even as the war drove both Indians and colonists to view North 
America as a land divided between red and white, Croghan, as an Indian agent with a 
wealth of experience with trans-cultural diplomacy and commerce, knew full well that 
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Indians were not a homogeneous group, politically or culturally. The Indian armed 
resistance that bears Pontiac’s name was by no means either a unified military or political 
effort. When Croghan arrived at Fort Pitt, he realized that reconciling Indians to British 
sovereignty required complicated negotiations, performed according to Indian diplomatic 
protocols, with Indian leaders as much at odds with one another as they were with British 
officials. Furthermore, the Indian nations with whom Croghan negotiated were not 
centralized polities, and agreed upon peace terms with one leader of that nation did not 
necessarily mean peace with all members of a nation. For example, while Croghan’s 
success during this mission was in a large part contingent upon cooperation with the 
Shawnees, the Shawnee military leader Charlot Kaské and those who followed him 
continued to fight against the British. Similarly, the various British polities that existed 
within North America were often at odds with each other. Tensions existed between 
individual colonies, such as Pennsylvania and Virginia, and between colonial and 
imperial governments. Moreover, Western Pennsylvania and Virginia were rife with 
informal colonial opposition to British Indian policy. 
 On March 1, 1765, the day after Croghan’s arrival, a number of Senecas arrived 
with messages from the Delawares and Shawnees. These messages demonstrate how the 
perception of French support for Indian resistance against the British (regardless of 
whether this was formal or not) served to advance Indian diplomatic aims. The messenger 
claimed that the previous summer, a delegation of Shawnees and Delawares had traveled 
to the Illinois Country and “that they had been well recd by the French, who, on their 
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arrival, clothed them & told them, they would supply them, with every necessary they 
wanted, to carry on the War agst the English; & would send Traders with them, to their 
towns.” Further, the message stated that western Indians were “all Engaged to support 
them, with their whole Force, should they continue the War against the English.”  45
However the delegation simultaneously reported that the Delawares and Shawnees had 
also met with Colonel Henry Bouquet, the British commander who had successfully 
relieved Fort Pitt. They had been informed that the British likewise had offered to “open 
a free Trade & intercourse with them, & supply them with Ammunition, Goods, & Rum, 
as usual & not prohibit the Sale of Powder & Liquors, as they had before the late 
difference happened.”  Finally, the messengers claimed that the Shawnees and 46
Delawares had thus sent word to the French that the French should “return home” (a 
point that Croghan sincerely doubted) and had informed the western nations that the 
Shawnees and Delawares intended to enter into negotiations with the English and that 
western Indian nations should “sit still, ‘till they heard farther from them in the Spring.”  47
 The legitimacy of British claims of formal French involvement in Pontiac’s War is 
debatable. Due to an absence of French sources confirming formal support to the Indian 
uprising, it seems that Indians such as Pontiac claimed French support both as a tool in 
opposing the extension of the British Empire and as a kind of invitation for a return of 
French imperialism. During the war, Pontiac symbolically boasted of his power by 
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appropriating French martial symbols. In doing so, he was simultaneously demonstrating 
his opposition to British control and his loyalty to France should the French regain 
control of the northern trans-Appalachian West. In the absence of formal French imperial 
orders, the only “texts” that lent legitimacy to British fears of French collusion were 
wampum belts delivered by the French to Indian allies and then interpreted by British 
officials. Sir William Johnson, in a letter to General Thomas Gage in 1767, cited one such 
belt, delivered to him by Huron Andrew, who had been present at Croghan’s Fort Pitt 
negotiations two years earlier: 
Huron Andrew a very faithfull Indian well known has delivered up a belt 
(now in my Custody) from Rochblave a French Officer at Misore 
[Missouri] opposite the Kuskuskies [Kaskaskia] to the Inds abt Detroit 
with an Artfull Message one part of which was that he was glad to hear 
they were in peace and Quietness but concluded on the other half of the 
Belt with desiring them to remember “That the french have been their 
father a Long while and that in a Short time he believed they would 
Quarrel with the English.”  48!
However, both locating and dating the exact origins of these belts is difficult and such 
evidence should be considered hearsay, regardless. Yet, such evidence does lend credence 
to the thesis that Pontiac and other Western Indians wanted to make sure that the French 
could not question Indian loyalty should the French return.  49
 However, while French imperial officials may not have offered concrete support 
to Indians fighting against the British, there is evidence of informal French support from 
French settlers and traders, remnants of French imperialism. Sir William Johnson came 
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into possession of a letter written by J. Capucin, one of a number of French traders 
without passports openly defying British authority by living in the Illinois Country. 
Capucin had taken an interest in Croghan’s diplomatic mission, stating “that, if [Croghan] 
arrives, he will be no better received than the others.”  Croghan had a long history of 50
antagonism with French traders, and it is reasonable to assume that Capucin would have 
been suspicious of Croghan. However, Capucin, like Pontiac, seemed to hope for a return 
of formal French imperial control. He concluded the letter by saying, “Every one seems 
to stretch out his arms to us [the French]. Heaven grant that the seeming disposition may 
come from the bottom of their hearts, and that the devices of the English may not corrupt 
the nations. That is what we must wish [emphasis original].”   51
 Regardless of whether French support was formal, informal, or a diplomatic bluff 
by Indians opposing the British, it was a powerful bargaining chip in the hands of Indian 
delegates. Trade was a central concern for Indian diplomats. The Seneca messengers who 
brought Croghan the information about the dealings of Delawares and Shawnees further 
west were quick to inform Croghan that they themselves rejected the French because the 
British promised to reopen trade upon the conclusion of hostilities. Several Indians who 
arrived after the Senecas inquired as to whether trade had resumed. Croghan responded to 
the first inquiry, stating “there was no Trade opened yet, nor could there be any, till the 
Shawanese [Shawnees] & Delawares had come in”  and solidified peace terms. Croghan 52
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later lamented, “The Several Indians, now here, which are about two Hundred, seem very 
Sulky on Account of their not being suffered to Trade, notwithstanding I have made use 
of every argument in my power, to explain to them the reasons of it.”  Indian delegates 53
also used the idea of western Indians trading for ammunition and supplies with the 
French to threaten the British. When eighty Senecas arrived with furs hoping to trade, 
they informed Croghan that two tribes of Delawares opposed Custaloga, calling him “an 
old Woman for agreeing to the terms,” and claimed that since the French and Indian 
Nations in the Illinois Country had “agreed to supply & support them, in the War against 
the English, they should be able to drive them out of this Country in less than two 
Years.”   54
 Thus, the Indian delegates were able to leverage British anxieties about continued 
French imperial interest in the region in order to advance their own goals. Croghan and 
the other British agents present realized that trade was an essential tool in garnering 
support from the various Indian nations. Although trade at Fort Pitt was not yet reopened 
at that point, Indian delegates were able to make clear the importance of trade in any 
lasting agreement. Conversely, were the British to ignore Indian demands for trade, they 
would do so at their own peril. Trade with the Indians was not a tool by which imperial 
powers manipulated indigenous loyalties but instead an arrangement that Indian delegates 
used to secure the goods that they desired while also bolstering their own diplomatic 
position. 
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Delays put negotiations on hold—Fort Pitt, March 20 to May 5, 1765 
 Croghan’s party grew anxious as members awaited the arrival of leaders of the 
Indian delegations. Lieutenant Alexander Fraser,  eager to arrive in Illinois by April as 55
per his orders, departed on his own on March 21 with a small party that included Huron 
Andrew, a Seneca, a Shawnee, and a Frenchman, Alexander Maisonville. However, these 
delays demonstrated much more than the anxiety felt by inconvenienced colonial 
officials; they were caused by the complicated diplomatic relationships that held the 
various delegations together. Tensions among the Delawares themselves and between 
Delawares and the Six Nations, disagreements over Indian captive-taking practice, and 
differing assumptions about diplomatic jurisdiction among British imperial and 
Pennsylvanian colonial officials all had to be reconciled before formal discussions could 
begin. Therefore, binary models that label actors as either colonizers or colonized, need 
to be abandoned in order to understand these diplomatic proceedings. 
 Croghan first had to wait for the Delawares to come to an agreement among 
themselves. As Croghan writes, “two Tribes of the Dellawares, were very averse to 
making Peace with the English, ‘till the return of Killbuck, from Sir Wm Johnson, and 
then if they liked the Terms, they should stand to them, but not otherwise.”  Johnson sent 56
a letter to Croghan, dated March 9, informing him that Killbuck supported Croghan’s 
efforts.  However, the letter did not reach Croghan and, more importantly, the Delawares 57
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until April 26. Instead, the Delawares claimed that Custaloga and his tribe were “the only 
people in that Nation, willing to be at peace with the English.”  58
 The Delawares had an additional motivation for hesitation; they claimed that a 
particular man among them had had a vision with instructions for negotiating peace. 
According to the vision, they were to consult with the Quakers first. Such a request 
exacerbated pre-existing British imperial tensions. Since the Albany Congress of 1754, 
British officials had attempted to centralize their diplomatic structures, most clearly 
expressed in the formation of the Indian Department. This was not an easy change for the 
colonies as both Pennsylvania and Virginia had their eyes on the Ohio Country and had 
used Native American diplomacy as a tool for achieving their expansionistic goals. 
Simultaneously, the Quakers formed the “Friendly Association” in 1756 in an attempt to 
supersede both centralized imperial and Pennsylvania Proprietary control, and took the 
side of the Delawares. Sir William Johnson, however, had acquired his considerable 
diplomatic power through cultivation of the Covenant Chain that traditionally bound the 
Iroquois and the British in friendship. This arrangement proved mutually beneficial to the 
British and the Iroquois, as the Six Nations used their preferred status to negotiate on 
behalf of other Indian nations, most especially the Delawares. Simultaneously, the British 
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came to rely on Iroquoian military power in order to enforce British sovereignty over the 
Delawares and other “subject” nations.   59
 The Delawares, in an attempt to dislodge themselves from the influence of the 
Johnson-backed Iroquois, argued that, through the Quakers, they should be considered 
the primary liaisons for European/Indian diplomacy. Delaware delegates argued “that the 
great Spirit had told them as they were the first nation, that met the Quakers, when first 
they, came to Philadelphia, they ought to be the first applyed to, in making a lasting 
Peace, for all other Nations in this Country, & if they wou’d agree to that, they would 
make a peace & bring all other Nations into it.”  George Croghan rebuffed the 60
Delawares’ allusion to precedent, emphasizing the emptiness of the Delaware argument 
while also claiming Quaker impotence on such matters. Considering that Croghan had a 
strong personal dislike of the Quakers developed during his years of negotiation and his 
intimate relationship with the Iroquois, he displayed little patience for the Delawares’ 
argument. He first sent a message back to the Delawares admonishing them on their 
tardiness. He also reminded them that when they had met earlier with Colonel Bouquet, 
they had informally agreed to peace terms. Finally, he implored “them to come here with 
the other Nations & Comply with [their] Engagements to Col: Boquet & not suffer 
themselves to be amused by idle Dreams, or Stories, that may be told them, by any 
Body.”  When the subject was brought up again, Croghan informed the Delaware 61
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delegates that “the Quakers could not make Peace with them.”  He then reminded the 62
delegates that the only nations yet to formally make peace in the region were the 
Delawares and Shawnees, and that the Shawnees were en route to do so. Croghan thus 
smugly concluded that if the Delawares truly wanted to hold out in order to treat with the 
Quakers, they were welcome to try, but they would likely “sit alone in the woods” were 
they to do so, since the Quakers did not hold the authority to negotiate.  63
 However, the Delawares were also calling upon a separate source of political 
influence, their leadership within spiritual revival movements. A Delaware prophet, 
Neolin, was Pontiac’s inspiration for the Indian confederacy of opposition to British 
imperial control. Neolin was a participant within a larger Delaware revival movement. In 
order to further bolster their claim to supernatural diplomatic instructions, the Delaware 
man mentioned above who experienced the vision made a visit to Fort Pitt and retold his 
experience to Croghan. The man, claiming it had been a hundred and fifteen days since 
he had the vision, referred to the Great Spirit in language that echoes the Lord’s Prayer: 
“I saw & spoke with our Father, whch is in Heaven… [who] allows us to know his Will.” 
He continued, 
in order to make a firm lasting friendship between one & other… the 
persons amongst the White People, to whom we are to speak to, on this 
head, by order of our Father, are the Quakers. …if we adhere to the advice 
our Father has given us, it will do us both good, as we are people of 
different Colours, who inhabit this continent. Our Father has likewise 
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spoke to my Chiefs, by me, giving them advice, in what manner to behave 
as Kings, and now they will act as Kings.  64!
The presence of overt, monotheistic language in the fashion of Christian doctrine 
combined with a message of peaceful racial segregation demonstrates that the man 
participated in the same revivalist discourse as Neolin, a discourse that had both political 
and spiritual functions. While “revitalizations” addressed perceived deficiencies in 
spiritual wellness, they also articulated a pan-Indianness that strengthened Indian 
diplomatic positions. By constructing an invading “other,” Indian nations were able to 
move past historical rivalries with each other and instead stand unified against 
colonization. However, while Neolin’s vision was an inspiration for the Western 
Confederacy, it is notable that only the Delawares mentioned this revitalization 
movement during the proceedings at Fort Pitt.     65
 For the Shawnees, their delay in the spring of 1765 illuminates the conflict over 
definitions of kinship that existed among the Shawnees and the British. As Croghan 
records, the Shawnees were delayed because “they were Collecting all our Flesh & Blood 
together, meaning all the English Prisoners.”  This was in response to the demands set 66
forth in earlier negotiations between the Shawnees and Colonel Henry Bouquet.  As was 67
customary among the various Indian nations of the eighteenth-century Northeast, the 
Shawnees had acquired many European “hostages” during their conflict with the British. 
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However, these were not hostages in the European sense. In the Indian method of warfare 
called the “mourning war,” many of those taken as captives during war were incorporated 
into Shawnee society as full, adoptive members. Thus, when the British demanded the 
repatriation of “flesh and blood” captives, the British were simultaneously demanding 
that the Shawnees willingly dismantle their own societies and kinship networks. The 
category “flesh and blood” appeared repeatedly throughout Croghan’s journal in order to 
distinguish between adoptive and natural kinship. Thus, the Shawnee had to adapt to this 
new category of as part of their capitulation.   68
 Coincidentally, the act of captive taking had served as a primary motivation for 
Shawnee militancy towards the British. Prior to the Seven Years’ War, the Shawnees had 
considered the British to be allies. However, in 1753, a Shawnee delegation was taken 
prisoner in Charles Town, South Carolina. By violating Shawnee understandings of 
hospitality and treating the captured delegation as criminals, the Shawnees declared a 
parallel Seven Years’ War against the British. In comparing the nature of the captivity 
experienced by the Shawnees and the adopted British captives, it seems that Shawnees’ 
willingness to return British “flesh and blood” evinced their war-weariness. The 
Shawnees must have found colonial captive-taking practices to be far more offensive than 
their own. Yet the Shawnees acquiesced to British demands for the return of captives. 
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Since Shawnee captives were integrated into Shawnee society, this was much more than a 
simple prisoner exchange, despite how the British might have viewed it.  69
 In the midst of these delays, a seemingly unrelated event took place that 
nonetheless illuminates an additional tension that put pressure on Croghan’s negotiations. 
On April 6, 1765, four Six Nations Indians arrived, having traveled by canoe down the 
Monongahela River. They carried with them five Cherokee scalps and informed Croghan 
that they had encountered a group of Virginian hunters “who like to have killed them.”  70
Long enemies, the Six Nations and Cherokees had only recently made peace and violence 
between the two groups was common. However, this violence, in conjunction with the 
threats received from the Virginians, demonstrates the tension between the official British 
vision for their imperial project and the reality of the colonial periphery. Europeans in the 
colonial periphery were often at odds with British imperial policy after the Seven Years’ 
War. These Virginians took little issue with killing Iroquois, even thought they were 
technically British allies. Within the Ohio County, British imperial administration was 
less fact and more fiction.  71
!
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Negotiations begin—Fort Pitt, May 7 to May 11, 1765 
 The Delawares received word from Killbuck on April 26 that they were to start 
negotiations with Croghan. When the Shawnee delegation arrived on May 7 with the 
“hostages” to be returned to the British, formal negotiations could finally begin. These 
negotiations provide insight into the function of cross-cultural diplomacy. Firstly, while 
Croghan set the agenda as the convener of the negotiations, and while the negotiations 
took place at a location unambiguously under British control, Croghan discursively 
entered into Indian territory. Secondly, over the course of these negotiations, success was 
dependent on “creative misunderstandings” in regards to kinship metaphors of 
sovereignty. Each party interpreted these metaphors in ways that satisfied their own 
diplomatic goals. These metaphors were central to Indian diplomatic understandings and 
the proceedings followed Indian diplomatic protocols.  
 Croghan’s value to the British was dependent on his ability to negotiate 
successfully using Indian diplomatic ways. Croghan’s written record of the proceedings, 
a convention of great importance in European diplomatic ways, eventually helped inform 
British policy, but beginning on May 8, the negotiations proceeded using strict and 
standard rituals, the “treaty protocol,” granting them legitimacy through Indian eyes. 
Before any negotiation could take place, the “At the Wood’s Edge Rite” had to be 
performed. While Croghan’s record merely notes that they “performed all the Ceremonies 
of Condolence, as usual, on Meetings of this nature,”  within the spiritualized ways of 72
 44
 Croghan in TNR, 9.72
Indian diplomacy, this process was of the utmost importance. It cleared the mind and 
prepared the soul for honesty and trust. In accordance with tradition, a night of rest 
followed. Similarly, these agreements were sealed by the presentation of belts of 
wampum, the official diplomatic method of record keeping preferred by the Indian 
delegations.  73
 The main purpose of the meeting, which resumed on May 9, was to reemphasize 
the promises made by the Shawnees to Colonel Bouquet the previous fall, such as the 
command “to deliver up all the English Prisoners & Negroes, which were in [their] 
several Villages.”  Additionally, Croghan emphasized that as conquerer, “the King of 74
Great Britain, [would] take under his protections, all the nations of Indians, in this 
Country, to the Sunsetting & restore tranquility, among all nations, that your Children 
unborn, may enjoy the blessing of a lasting peace.”  Additionally, Croghan claimed that 75
his authority to speak was granted not by the leaders of the various colonies, but by 
General Thomas Gage, the commander-in-chief of British forces in North America. Such 
a claim demonstrates the movement away from individual colonial management of Indian 
diplomacy towards a unified British Indian policy. Finally, Croghan invited delegates to 
join him on his journey westward to reconcile with the Natives of the Illinois Country. 
This demonstrates that Croghan was aware that support from the Shawnees, Delawares, 
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and Six Nations was essential for success further west. However, Croghan’s invitation 
also shows that the Indian delegates had their own westward political interests as well.  76
 After Croghan delivered his speech and belts using the Native diplomatic 
protocols, Kiashuta, the Seneca delegate, rose to speak and in so doing, demonstrated the 
complicated and stratified nature of suzerainty and subjecthood being negotiated in this 
new imperial arrangement. Kiashuta had served as a military leader opposing the British 
during Pontiac’s War. Yet, he admonished the delegates of the other nations for their 
reticence in agreeing to British terms, saying “they [the English] have desired nothing of 
you, but what you solemnly promised last Fall to Col: Boquet, all which you ought to 
perform…if you do not, you must take the consequences, for we are determined, to 
comply with what our Brethren desire of us.”  It is also surprising that Kiashuta was 77
afforded authority as a member of the Six Nations, despite being a representative of the 
Ohio Senecas who had long acted independently of the Onondaga council.   78
 Kiashuta’s diplomatic tack can be seen as a means of utilizing Iroquoian 
preferential treatment under the Covenant Chain. During these negotiations, Kiashuta, 
along with the other delegates, used the metaphoric language of kinship. In some ways, it 
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can be difficult to ascertain the exact relationships of subject nations through the 
interpretation of kinship metaphors. This is possibly one example of “creative 
misunderstanding” at work. British agents and Indian delegates could assume different 
things in regards to the meaning of these kinship metaphors, a malleability that facilitated 
agreement. While the British may have assumed that being called fathers equated to 
being called lords, Indians would have interpreted such a kinship metaphor to mean an 
established arrangement of reciprocity. However, within the context of the negotiations at 
Fort Pitt, there are stark differences and at times changes in how these metaphors were 
used. Kiashuta referred to the British as “Brethren,” never once calling either the British 
generally or the King specifically “Father,” alluding to an equality within their alliance. 
He did however, when addressing the Delawares and the Shawnees a day later, extend 
British fatherhood over the latter two nations by declaring “You have now heard every 
thing your Fathers, the English, had to say to you, and you have assured them you will 
comply with every thing they desired, be strong.”   79
 The Shawnees on the other hand, were much quicker to refer to both the King of 
England and the British more generally as “fathers.” An unnamed Shawnee delegate 
addressed the Delaware delegation: “You have heard, what our Father, the King of 
England has said to us & likewise, what your Uncles the Six Nations have said to us, they 
have desired nothing, but what is right.”  The British king was referred to as “Father,” a 80
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title previously bestowed upon the French.  Lawoughgua, another delegate of the 81
Shawnee, granted the paternal title to all the British representatives present at the 
conference: 
Fathers, for so we shall call you hence forward, listen to what we are 
going to say to you. It gave us great satisfaction Yesterday to be called the 
Children of the King of England, & convinces us, that your intentions 
towards us are upright, as we know a Father will be tender to his Children, 
& they more ready to obey him, than a Brother; therefore, we hope our 
Father, will now take better care of his Children than has heretofore been 
done.  82!
Clearly, Lawoughgua is expressing a new relationship between the British and the 
Shawnees. However, he is also making clear that “Fatherhood” is not lordship by 
explicitly stating how the Shawnees expect to be treated within this new arrangement.  83
 The Delawares were more cautious as they refused to address Croghan and the 
British in such superior terms. However, just as Croghan was able to convince the 
Delawares to abandon their intention to treat first with the Quakers, in his last address to 
the conference, Custaloga finally acquiesced to British “fatherhood,” saying, “Fathers: I 
must now call you.”  Considering that many of the Delawares had expressed their doubts 84
concerning Custaloga’s leadership during the delays prior to negotiations, this must have 
angered many of the other Delawares present. Were it not for the message from Killbuck 
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that the Delawares had received prior to negotiation, it is unlikely that Custaloga would 
have been allowed to confer “fatherhood” to the British.  85
 In addition to his use of kinship metaphors, Lawoughgua also demonstrated his 
willingness to acquiesce to British demands by returning the British hostages, or as the 
Shawnees would have seen them, adopted members of Shawnee society. “You likewise 
put us in mind, of our promises to Col: Boquet, which were to bring your Flesh & Blood 
to be delivered at this place. Father you have not spoke for nothing, we have prepared, 
you see, we have brot them with us.”  However, a later comment exposes the challenge 86
such a demand put on Shawnee society: “They have been all tied to us by adoption, and 
altho’ we now deliver them up to you, we will always look upon them as our relations 
whenever the great Spirit is pleased that we may visit them.”  Finally, out of concern for 87
the well-being of the “hostages,” Lawoughgua concludes, “We have taken as much care 
of these prisoners as if they were our own Flesh and Blood; they are now become 
unacquainted with your Customs & manners, & therefore, Fathers, we request you will 
use them tenderly & kindly, which will be a means of inducing them to live contently 
with you.”  88
 This final comment, imploring Croghan to be understanding of the culture shock 
that the returned “hostages” were sure to experience, also served a diplomatic function. 
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The previous day, Croghan had admonished the Indian delegations, stating “the Hostages 
you delivered Col: Boquet, have all shamefully run away except three, tho’ they were all, 
as well used here, as any of our own People, & never confined. This Conduct Brethren, 
has given all your Brethren the English, a suspicion of your sincerity.”  Lawoughgua 89
thus reminds Croghan that these “hostages” were likely more comfortable within 
Shawnee society. In fact, during the period of delay prior to the start of negotiations, two 
“hostages,” both young girls, were returned by the Delawares. Croghan commented that 
neither spoke any English.  Thus, the flight of former captives was not due to any Indian 90
duplicity but instead likely the actions of frightened individuals. In fact, it is surprising 
that Croghan did not understand this dynamic in the first place, as Croghan himself had 
been initiated into Mohawk society. However, if Croghan was instructed to enforce the 
terms previously agreed upon with Colonel Bouquet, perhaps Croghan was expressing 
official imperial policy despite his personal knowledge to the contrary. 
 At this conference, held from May 7 to May 11, 1765, “hostages” were returned 
and kinship metaphors redefined. The Shawnees, Delawares, and Senecas present 
affirmed their intentions of making peace with the British and looked forward to the 
reopening of trade. Thus, as the conference concluded, the delegates made plans for the 
next steps in the mission that would have a profound effect on both Indian diplomatic 
relations among Indian nations and the relationship between the Indians of the northern 
trans-Appalachian West and the British. While securing peace in western Pennsylvania 
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was essential, Pontiac and his allies in the Western Confederacy remained in Illinois 
Country. Croghan had previously travelled into this region and he knew British 
sovereignty was merely a fiction written upon European maps. He was well aware that 
diplomatic success depended upon the support of the Delawares, Shawnees, and Senecas 
who were his newly established Indian allies. Fortunately for him, the Indian leaders in 
attendance demonstrated their support in two ways. The first was symbolic, but within 
the context of Native diplomacy, of the utmost importance. Custaloga prepared Croghan 
for his trip by stating, “as you told us you were ordered to visit the Western Nations, I 
now wipe your Eyes, and open your Ears, that you may see and hear those Nations with 
pleasure when they speak to you. I likewise clear the way, that you may have a safe 
passage to the place you are going.”  While Croghan was headed to Illinois, members of 91
the various Indian delegations, including Kiashuta, were simultaneously preparing to 
travel to Iroquoia and Johnson Hall to confirm the Fort Pitt proceedings with Sir William 
Johnson. Croghan returned the favor: 
You have made a good choice; I am well acquainted with your Tribes, and 
I know these to be the Chiefs & Men of consequence in your Nations; I 
approve of them; Therefore, Brethren, I now make the Road smooth and 
easy to their feet, & remove any Logs that may have fallen across it, that 
you may Travel safe to Sir William Johnson’s.  92!
In addition to the symbolic support, the Indian delegations also provided deputies to 
accompany Croghan into Illinois. As Croghan journeyed westward, he became 
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increasingly dependent on Indian martial power and political authority as British 
authority barely extended beyond the walls of their garrisoned forts.  93
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Fig. 2: Treaty signed by Delawares, Shawnees, and Ohio Senecas at Johnson Hall, July 
13, 1765. Kiashuta’s mark is circled.  
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The delegation heads toward Detroit—Moving down the Ohio River and up the 
Wabash River to Fort Ouiatenon, May 15 to July 18, 1765 
 George Croghan left Fort Pitt with his delegation of Shawnees, Delawares, and 
Senecas on May 17, 1765. Every mile he traveled down the Ohio River carried him 
further from firmly British colonial territory. No longer was he able to rely on his 
connections to empire. Instead, he had to depend on the military and diplomatic power of 
his delegation and the connections he made with Ohio Indians during his time as a trader. 
However, he did not abandon his own personal and imperial ambitions. As soon as he 
left, he began keeping a second journal with a duplicitous purpose, to scout the Ohio 
Country for future colonization. Yet, while Croghan succeeded in communicating a 
sincerity that he lacked to the Indians he encountered, and while he was wise to defer to 
the influence of his Indian colleagues within his delegation in order to accomplish his 
diplomatic goals, a large portion of the delegation’s success was contingent on 
unforeseeable circumstances.   94
 While Croghan continued to keep an official journal of his negotiations, he also 
began making careful observations of the flora, fauna, and physical geography through 
which he traveled. At one point he wrote that “The Country hereabouts abounds with 
Buffuloes, Bears Deer and all sorts of Wild Game in such plenty that we Killed out of our 
Boats as much as we wanted.” He later added, “the soil on the Banks of Scioto for a vast 
Distance up the Country is prodigious rich.”  There can be little doubt that Croghan was 95
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making sure that his trip would serve as a personal investment as well as a service to the 
King. In a letter to Sir William Johnson written the December after his return, he advised 
Johnson on the advantages of British settlement of the Ohio Country. It would integrate 
new French subjects, provide grain for other colonies, and connect frontier forts with the 
established colonies of the East. Furthermore, Croghan believed that “Indigo Sugar 
Cotton Oil Tobacco, Rice, Hemp and Hops,” along with silk, could become lucrative cash 
crops.  Additionally, a colony would open up increased fur trade. Considering that 96
Croghan became a primary investor in the proposed Vandalia colony that incorporated 
these newly gained territories, promoting the value of the land had potentially profound 
personal economic benefits and demonstrated Croghan’s lack of commitment to the 
Proclamation of 1763. As an agent of Sir William Johnson, he emphasized the sincerity of 
the British to the Indian delegates with whom he met, yet he was simultaneously 
formulating plans for land speculation and settlement.  97
 After traveling west along the Ohio River, on June 6 Croghan and his company 
arrived at the mouth of the Wabash River. Turning north, the delegation began traveling 
by foot. Two days later, Croghan’s party was attacked. Croghan estimated that “Eighty 
Warriors of the Kicapers [Kickapoos] and Musquatimes [Foxes]” assailed them, killing 
two of Croghan’s men plus three of his Shawnee delegation and severely wounding 
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Croghan himself.  They also captured the extremely important cargo of gifts intended for 98
future negotiations. For the second time during his mission, large quantities of trade 
goods, including gold and silver specie, were lost, although in this instance, they were 
confiscated, not destroyed. Concerning his own injury, Croghan later commented, “I got 
the Stroke of a Hatchet on the Head, but my Scull being pretty thick, the hatchet would 
not enter, so You may See a thick scull is of Service on some Occasions.”  All 99
subsequent light-heartedness aside, only by deft navigation of the complex confluence of 
political tensions did Croghan’s party escape. As the Kickapoos and Foxes held Croghan 
in custody, one of his Shawnee delegates who had escaped, having been shot in the leg, 
emerged from the woods and reframed the perceived conflict, causing the assailants to 
question their motives. The delegate “made a bold speech telling them that the Whole 
Northward Indians would join in taking Revenge for the Insult and murder of their 
People.”  Croghan further commented that the attackers “began excusing themselves 100
saying their Fathers the French had spirited them up telling them the Inglish were coming 
with a body of Southern Indians to take their Country from them and inslave them.”  101
Later in his journal, Croghan clarified that the “Southern Indians” referred to were 
Cherokees.  102
 The anxiety that the Kickapoos and Foxes felt about encroaching Cherokee war 
parties was not unfounded. John Stuart had used his alliance with the Cherokees to create 
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a military buffer between the Western Confederacy and the southern colonies. Bolstered 
by British support, the Cherokees had focused much of their attention on disrupting trade 
moving up the Mississippi River from New Orleans, with the purpose of cutting off 
Pontiac’s supply chains. This was consistent with the British imperial strategy of divide 
and conquer. These raids also supplied the Cherokees with the kinds of valuable trade 
goods that they sought.  103
 Additionally, this attack demonstrated that the Western Confederacy was not 
tightly unified. Pontiac was, at this point, aware that Croghan’s party was headed to meet 
him. Yet this group of Kickapoos and Foxes attacked Croghan’s delegation, 
demonstrating the fractured nature of Pontiac’s coalition. As previously noted, Pontiac 
was but one of many important military and political leaders in the Western Confederacy. 
Even as the Western Confederacy acted upon the pan-Indian inspiration of Neolin’s 
vision, they were sharply divided about how to react to encroaching Indians and 
imperialists. 
 There was a final precedent for the Kickapoos and Foxes to fear enslavement at 
the hands of the Cherokees. Among Indians of the Southeast, traditional captive-taking 
practices had melded with European definitions of slavery. Population decreases and 
economic pressures transformed Southeastern Indian societies. As such, Indian nations 
bordering the Southern colonial populations looked toward bordering Indian lands, such 
as the land north of the Ohio River, as a source of captives. While the British had stopped 
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buying Indian slaves from the Cherokees at this point, the memory of these raids 
remained. Furthermore, while captives may have been adopted, those held by Southern 
Indian nations such as the Cherokees, without being adopted, lived a life of servitude. In 
the region of the Great Lakes, the French had similarly adapted local Indian slaving 
practices to serve the French colonial economy. The Foxes themselves had participated in 
this French-backed slave trade, only to be enslaved themselves by the French during the 
Fox Wars. The Kickapoos and Foxes were well aware that Indian invaders allied with 
colonial powers, whether French or British, could intend to enslave them.  104
 In response, the Shawnee delegate did not threaten the Kickapoos and Foxes with 
British retribution but instead Indian military power. Croghan’s Britishness did not save 
him, but instead he was spared because of his alliance with the Shawnees. As Croghan 
later commented, “There is nothing those nations [of the Illinois Country] dread more 
than a War with the Shawnese, Delawares and Six Nations, all of which will be the 
Consequence.”  Croghan was far from the support of the British military. Although 105
British authorities eventually received word of Croghan’s ill treatment, the British had no 
real power so far from the colonial centers. In a sense, Croghan, as a British agent, 
borrowed a French imperial tactic and expressed his authority not as a powerful outsider 
but as a member of Indian political and military networks. 
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 While the Shawnee delegate’s speech convinced the Kickapoos and Foxes to take 
care of their captives, they did not set Croghan and his party free nor did they return the 
gifts that they confiscated. Instead, the Kickapoos and Foxes escorted their captives to a 
village in the vicinity of Post Vincent, or Vincennes, a French settlement along the 
Wabash River. As Croghan continued northward, while in custody he observed both the 
potential for future colonial exploitation as well as the malleability of power 
arrangements. Despite his captivity, Croghan did not neglect his journaling, positing that 
cash crops such as tobacco would be “preferable to that of Maryland or Virginia.”  106
When they arrived Croghan noted that the settlement contained a French population of 
“about 80 houses.”  He made note of the inferiority of French authority in the region, 107
commenting that he could not “get any Frenchman in that Town to furnish [him] with 
Pen, Ink or Paper, without the consent of the Indians.”  The region’s Piankeshaws, on 108
the other hand, “were very much displeased with the Party that took [Croghan] telling 
them our and your Chiefs are gone to make peace and you have begun a War for which 
our Women and Children will have Reason to cry.”  The Piankeshaws’ arguments must 109
have been convincing, as Croghan and his delegation were emancipated, although a 
portion of the gold and silver was never returned. 
 After being set at liberty, Croghan’s delegation traveled towards Fort Ouiatenon, a 
French trading post further up the Wabash River that had been handed over to the British 
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only to be captured by the Wabash Indians during Pontiac’s War. The party reached a 
clearing six miles from Ouiatenon on June 23 and were met by leaders of the Kickapoos, 
Foxes, and other Indian inhabitants of the Ouiatenon region (Croghan referred to them 
simply as “Cuiatanons”). Present were Indians with whom Croghan had been previously 
acquainted who “seemed greatly concerned at what had happened.” They then “went 
immediately to the Kicapoos and Musquatimes [Foxes] and Charged them to take the 
greatest Care of us till their Chiefs should arrive from the Illinois.”  However, not all 110
Indians in the region were happy to see Croghan emancipated. On July 1, “A Frenchman 
arrived from the Ilinois with a Pipe and Speech from them to the Kickapoos & 
Musquattamies, to have me Burnt, this Speech was said to be sent from a Shawanese Indn 
who resides at the Ilinois, & has been during the War, & is much Attached to the French 
interest.”  It is likely that the Shawnee behind this was Charlot Kaské, who, though a 111
former ally of Pontiac, continued to resist the British after Pontiac agreed to peace terms. 
If the war against the British were to continue, Kaské’s followers would have benefitted 
greatly from the failure of Croghan’s mission. Furthermore, if Croghan’s party had been 
in fact a group of British-backed Cherokees as the attackers initially suspected, it is 
possible that Kickapoos, Foxes, and other Wabash Indian nations would be motivated by 
such aggression to continue their war against the British. However, by attacking the 
Shawnees, and not Cherokees, the opposite occurred. The Kickapoos and Foxes, under 
the threat of retribution from the Shawnees, realized that peace with the British was their 
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only option. Therefore they quickly dismissed Kaské’s request for Croghan’s execution. 
As Croghan records: 
As soon as this Speech was delivered to the Indians by the French, the 
Indians informed me of it in Council, & expressed their great concern for 
what had already happened, & told me they then sett me & my People at 
liberty, & assured me they despised the Message sent them, and would 
return the Pipe & Belt to their Fathers the French.  112!
 As far as Croghan’s diplomatic contribution, his record of these meetings is 
sparse; he wrote that he “had the greatest Difficulties in removing these Prejudices 
[against the British] as these Indians are a weak foolish and credulous People they are 
easily imposed on by a desining People [the French] who have led them hitherto as they 
please.”   However, he claimed he was “lucky enough to reconcile those Nations to His 113
Majesties Interest & obtain[ed] their Consent and Approbation to take Possession of any 
Posts in their Country which the French had formerly possessed…all of which they 
Confirmed by four large Pipes.”  Thus, what at first appeared to be a doomed 114
expedition became another diplomatic success. Not only was Croghan’s delegation able 
to turn their captors into allies, Croghan was bolstered by positive news, passed to him 
through a messenger from Pontiac, which he recounted in a letter to Sir William Johnson: 
Pondiac has Greatt Sway AMoungst those Nations and is on his Way hear. 
he Sent Me a Mesidge by ye. frenchmen that Came hear yesterday that he 
wold be Glad to See Me and that if he Licked what I had to Say he wold 
Do Every thing in his power to Reconcile all Nations to the English as he 
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is an old Aquaintance of Mine I hope I Shall be able to Setle Matters with 
him on a Good footing.  115!
Pontiac was on his way and was willing to make peace and lead the Western Confederacy 
to peace as well. 
 Croghan left the region of Fort Ouiatenon on July 18, augmenting his delegation 
with leaders from the Native nations represented at Post Vincent and the village outside 
of the Fort. En route to Detroit, Croghan met up with Pontiac who was with the Indian 
delegates who had departed Fort Pitt with Lieutenant Fraser. They then immediately 
returned to Ouiatenon. Croghan initiated another conference with the Indians residing 
there with Pontiac now present. During this negotiation Pontiac, along with the other 
Indians present, agreed 
to every thing the other Nations had done, all which they Confirmed by 
Pipes, & Belts, but told me the French had informed them that the English 
intended to take their Country from them, & give it to the Cherokees to 
settle on…and they would make Slaves of them, that this was the reason 
of the Opposing the English hitherto.  116!
Not only did Pontiac express his concern about a British invasion, he also echoed the 
assumptions made by the Kickapoos and Foxes about British-sponsored Cherokee 
offensives. Pontiac was concerned about more than British imperialism; he feared that 
Indian nations such as the Cherokees were attempting to leverage their alliance with the 
British in order to gain access to land in the Ohio and Illinois countries and enslave their 
inhabitants. Croghan did not record his own words during these negotiations, only that he 
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“settled all matters with the Ilinois Indians.”  Whether Croghan’s brevity was indicative 117
of the ease of negotiations or not, the most challenging and important negotiations were 
certainly yet to come. 
 The journey thus far had certainly been eventful. Croghan barely survived the trip, 
and a number of the delegates who traveled with him were not so lucky. Yet, the party 
also achieved diplomatic success. This success was contingent upon Croghan’s ability to 
transition from a reliance on his British connections toward Shawnee martial power. 
Croghan also successfully masked his duplicitous intentions, convincing the Indian 
delegates with whom he met that the British intended to respect their sovereignty while 
he simultaneously performed reconnaissance for future colonial settlement. Finally, much 
of Croghan’s success depended on his ability to leverage unforeseen circumstances, such 
as the earlier assault upon his delegation, into diplomatic victories. The majority of his 
journey behind him, Croghan then turned his attention toward the capstone of his 
mission, his negotiations with Pontiac at Detroit. 
!
Croghan and Pontiac finish their negotiations—Detroit, July 25 to September 26, 
1765 
 Croghan and Pontiac, along with their continually expanding delegation of 
Shawnees, Delawares, Senecas, Kickapoos, and Foxes, set off toward Detroit on July 25. 
This final stage of the peace process again demonstrates Croghan’s nature as an agent 
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simultaneously in service of Sir William Johnson and his own financial self-interest. He 
continued to journal and make notes concerning future settlement even as he emphasized 
Indian sovereignty in the region. Additionally, the final negotiation between Croghan and 
Pontiac was representative of the creatively misunderstood metaphors that dominated 
diplomacy in the northern trans-Appalachian West. These metaphors were flexible and 
were often interpreted in differing ways, yet they were essential for both sides as they 
sought to reach an agreement concerning the terms of peace.  
 As the delegation traveled by canoe down the Maumee River toward Lake Erie, 
their route took them past villages of the Miamis and Ottawas. As they passed, Croghan 
wrote that “they delivered me all the English Prisoners they had, & I found as I passed by 
those Towns, that several of the Indians had set off for Detroit.”  Of course, Croghan 118
did not neglect his geographic and ecological observations. He noted both the potential 
for agriculture and the ease of transport using the Wabash River and the difficulty of river 
navigation above Fort Ouiatenon. When arriving at one Miami village, Croghan 
commented in his personal journal—and not his official one—that the French living in 
the area were “lazy indolent People fond of Breeding Mischief and Spiriting up the 
Indians against the English and Should by no Means be suffered to remain here” and that 
the “Indians Knew me and conducted us to their Village where they immediately hoisted 
an English Flag which I had formerly given them at Fort Pitt.”  It is curious that this 119
overt sign of political allegiance was left out of the official journal and calls into question 
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Croghan’s integrity. Croghan was perhaps attempting to convey to potential investors that 
colonization would be welcome while being more honest about the diplomatic challenges 
within official imperial channels. Regardless, it is clear that Croghan had British 
colonization and settlement, and his own fortune, on his mind as he travelled to Detroit. 
 Upon arriving at Detroit on August 17, Croghan continued to work with Indian 
leaders to accomplish British imperial goals. However, he could only accomplish this 
task with the support of his martial alliances with other Indian nations. Croghan met first 
with leaders of the Twightwees (Miamis), Weas, Piankeshaws, Wyandots (Hurons), 
Kickapoos, and Foxes. Also present were the delegates from the Delawares, Shawnees, 
and Six Nations. While the Western delegates confirmed that the King of England was 
their “father,” they did so by addressing the representatives of the easterly Indian nations, 
apologizing, “on several Belts & Pipes, beging in the most abject Manner that [the 
British] would forgive [the Western nations] for the ill Conduct of their Young Men, to 
take Pity on their Women & Children & grant thm peace.”  They then affirmed that the 120
French had been conquered, and that the British were now “sovereign” in the region. 
[T]hey saw the heavy Clouds that Hung over their Heads for some time 
past were now dispersed, and that the Sun shone clear & bright, and that as 
their Father the King of England had Conquered the French in that 
Country & taken into his friendship all the Indian Nations, they hoped for 
the future they would be a happy People.   121!
British sovereignty was facilitated, as it had been immediately after the attack on 
Croghan’s party, by the threat of Indian military retribution, not British. An unnamed 
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Wyandot delegate later proclaimed to the Shawnees and other Indian delegates present 
(but not Croghan) that the Western nations were to: 
behave themselves well to their Fathers the English, who had now taken 
them under their Protection, that if they did they would be a happy People, 
that if they did not listen to the Councils of their Fathers, they must take 
the Consequences, having assured them that all Nations to the Sun riseing 
had taken fast hold of their Fathers the English by the hand, & would 
follow their Advice, & do every thing they desired them, & never would 
let slip the Chain of Friendship now so happily renewed.  122!
As Croghan facilitated the implementation of new imperial arrangements, the Western 
delegates made it clear that they feared retribution from the easterly nations even as they 
showed deference to British protection.  
 On August 27, Croghan opened the largest conference of his trip, meeting with 
Pontiac along with leaders of the Ottawas, Chippewas (Ojibwas), Potawatomis, and 
Hurons. Again, demonstrating his mastery of the “treaty protocol,” Croghan began with a 
“recitation of the law ways,” stating that the “Antient Council Fire...has been negleted for 
some time past, since those high Winds has arose & raised some heavy Clouds over your 
Country.”  He then turned to the traditional Condolence Rituals:  123
I disperse all the black Clouds from over your heads, that the Sun may 
shine clear on your Women and Children….I gather up all the Bones of 
your deceased  friends, & bury them deep in the Ground….I take the 
Hatchet out of your Hands & I pluck up a large Tree & Bury it deep, so 
that it may never be found any more, & I plant the Tree of Peace, where all 
our Children may sit under & smoak in Peace with their Fathers.  124!
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Pontiac responded, offering a pipe to be given to Sir William Johnson as a sign of peace. 
He thanked Croghan for reigniting the long neglected council fire and then began 
discussing more concrete issues, such as requesting the loan of weapons and munitions 
on credit, as the French had done previously, to be repaid with the spoils of the hunt.  125
 In addition, Pontiac negotiated imperial geography. He began by informing the 
British that he and his people were “now settled on the Miamis River, not far from 
Hence, whenever you want us you will find us there ready to wait on you.”  He insisted 126
that such a location would be ideal for maintaining peace. If the Ottawas settled too close 
to Detroit and the liquor present there, they “would be always drunk, which might 
Occasion some Quarrels between the Soldiers & them.”  However, Pontiac did not want 127
to be cut off from the liquor trade completely. He added that since their new settlement 
was “nigh this place, that when we want to drink, we can easily come for it.”  At the 128
conclusion of the meetings on August 28, Pontiac addressed the British, asking: “Father 
you Stoped up the Rum Barrel when we came here, ‘till the Business of this Meeting was 
over, as it is now finished, we request you may open the Barrel that your Children may 
drink and be merry,” further demonstrating a desire for limited access to the liquor 
trade.  129
 However, it was not until September 4 that Pontiac made known what was 
perhaps the most important requirement for continued peace: 
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the French had settled part of their Country, which they never had sold to 
them, & hoped their Fathers the English, would take it into Consideration, 
& see that a proper Satisfaction was made to them…their Country was 
very large, & they were willing to give up such part of it, as was 
Necessary for their Fathers the English, to carry on Trade at, provided they 
were paid for it, & a sufficient part of the Country left them to Hunt on.  130!
Croghan took this demand seriously. Commenting later, Croghan assured Johnson that 
while living among the Natives in the Illinois Country, he was able to establish 
agreements with the various nations; Natives would welcome British settlement as long 
as it was accompanied by trade and payment for the land being used.  However, the 131
Natives also insisted upon being compensated for French settlements there and at Detroit. 
The French had occupied the forts as trade partners. As far as the Western Confederacy 
was concerned, this did not give the French the right to hand the forts over to the British. 
Croghan offered no argument against this logic and thus tacitly acknowledged Pontiac’s 
coalition’s ability to back up their demands. 
 For the rest of the month, Croghan continued to confer with Native leaders from 
various nations, all with similar results. A representative of the Ottawas and Chippewas 
of the Chicago region at one point stated, “‘tis true we have been Fools, & have listened 
to evil reports, & the whistling of bad Birds,”  while another said, “we are no more than 132
Wild Creatures to you Fathers in understanding, therefore we request you’l forgive the 
past follies of our young people, & receive us for your Children, since you have thrown 
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down our former Father on his back.”  Pontiac, along with other leaders from his loose 133
confederacy, confirmed British territorial sovereignty and denounced the French. 
Croghan certainly must have been pleased with himself, as he had satisfied his superiors’ 
highest hopes, all while performing ample reconnaissance for the increase of his own 
fortune. Yet, his final words delivered to the Native Americans on September 25, 1765, 
evinced his own apprehension about the tenuousness of these newly established 
relationships:  
Children Sometimes bad people take the liberty of stragling into your 
Country, I desire if you meet any such people to bring them Immediately 
here, likewise I desire that none of your young Men may Steal any Horses 
out of this Settlement… we shall see always strict Justice done to you, & 
expect the same from you.  134!
He sealed the conference with a symbol of his sincerity, presenting them clothes, 
weapons, and rum. At this he implored them to “stop [their] Ears against the Whistling of 
bad Birds, & mind nothing else but [their] Hunting…that [they] may enjoy the Blessing 
of Peace.”  135
 George Croghan was again able to convince the Indian delegates present at the 
Detroit conference of the sincerity of British pledges to respect the autonomy of the 
nations who made up the Western Confederation. It would seem that Croghan believed 
that respecting Native land rights was essential for lasting peace. But this did not mean 
that Croghan intended to respect those rights indefinitely. He continued to journal and 
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scheme about future colonization. Because the metaphors that facilitated their diplomatic 
agreements were flexible, revolving around kinship metaphors and promises of trade and 
reciprocity, there was space to interpret these agreements in different ways moving 
forward. Both sides left the conference satisfied, but a lasting peace was not to be. 
However, while the conference at Detroit may have failed to secure peace in the long 
term, it was a significant moment that serves as a “telling example” of the imperial 
process at work within the larger narrative of Indian-European diplomacy and trans-
Appalachian colonization. 
!
Conclusion !
 A year later, Pontiac joined Sir William Johnson at Fort Ontario and formally 
ended the war that would bear his name. While Croghan had followed the proper Indian 
protocol necessary to secure peace terms from a Native point of view, it was important 
that documents were signed in the presence of the Northern Superintendent in order to 
satisfy European diplomatic protocols. At Fort Ontario, Pontiac and Johnson did not 
ignore Indian protocols, as both men shared a smoke from the pipe that Pontiac had given 
to Croghan to pass on to Johnson a year earlier. Yet the proceedings of 1766 could not 
cement any real peace. Although the details are unclear, it appears that a zealot of 
Pontiac’s former cause murdered Pontiac. Simultaneously, the Indian Department and its 
Royal Proclamation of 1763 were included in the litany of grievances that eventually 
pushed the British colonies into open rebellion against the crown. Croghan himself was 
 70
detained for potential loyalist sympathies and died penniless after the Revolution’s 
conclusion. By many standards, therefore, it would be easy to dismiss Croghan’s work in 
1765 as inconsequential. He represented a department within an empire that lost any 
authority in the northern trans-Appalachian West just over a decade later at the 
conclusion of the American Revolution. Although the nascent nation of the United States 
may have been inheritors of Croghan’s diplomacy, the agreements that the Western 
Confederacy and British reached were no longer binding.  136
 By observing the proceedings of Croghan’s diplomatic mission, it becomes clear 
that while Croghan may have initiated and guided the conferences, the imperial 
conclusions that were reached were as much an expression of Indian agency as they were 
of imperial policy. The many Indian nations that Croghan encountered had expressed 
their disdain for empire through military force. And while they did not succeed in fully 
overthrowing the British yoke, they did succeed in getting their voices heard in the 
imperial process. Similarly, the influence of resentful colonists reverberated through the 
proceedings as did the residual influence of French imperialism, demonstrating that the 
process of British imperial centralization was far from achieving a uniform application. 
Instead, empire was constructed through a complex web of countervailing forces. 
 George Croghan’s mission provides an invaluable opportunity to construct a 
narrative, albeit a narrow one, around a moment of imperial process. Such a narrative 
aids in deconstructing larger teleological narratives of European westward progress, 
 71
 Dowd, 249-254, 260; Wainwright, 300-310.136
debunking the assumptions enfolded into broader concepts such as Manifest Destiny. 
Similarly, binary models that divide historical actors into firm categories, such as red and 
white, civilized and savage, or metropolitan and peripheral, are unsatisfactory when an 
event is observed using this microhistorical/Atlantic approach. Moreover, this narrative 
demonstrates that despite their better efforts, imperialists were not alone in constructing 
the contours of trans-Atlantic empires. Instead, such a narrow yet interconnected example 
demonstrates that the success of imperial moments such as Croghan’s mission were 
contingent upon the participation, influence, and resistance of a diverse set of historical 
actors, each with their own particular interests and connected to differing networks of 
power. As such, George Croghan’s mission to meet with Pontiac in the summer of 1765 
serves as a “telling example” that demonstrates that historical moments are 
simultaneously contingent upon immediate and unforeseeable circumstances and the vast 
webs of influence and interest that drove eighteenth-century imperialism.  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